Vested Interests & Conflation

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Introduction to Resolution Theory

By now, those of you who’ve read the previous seminars will have been justifiably impatient to begin some discussion of my philosophical model itself, Resolution Theory, rather than simply discussing the intellectual tools we can use to examine any philosophical model or general argument. The seminars to date have been important, however, because my long experience of discussing philosophy – and my own philosophical model in particular – have led me to understand that if you don’t begin with the intellectual tools, they force their way into the discussion sooner or later anyway – and by then, you lose valuable time in back-tracking to establish the tools.

However, with the few intellectual tools we’ve already assembled in the philosopher’s toolkit (and there’ll be more to come, as promised), the time has finally come to take the first look at the philosophical model – Resolution Theory – itself. I’ll begin with an overview, in the form of the foundational propositions of Resolution Theory. These propositions contain all of the basic elements of Resolution Theory, and they make it pretty clear where I’m coming from, and what Resolution Theory entails. I’ll take the propositions one at a time, over the coming few seminars. This time, we’ll deal with Proposition One:

Proposition 1) What You See Is What You Get

By this, I mean that there is an external reality, that this reality is not an illusion, that this reality is independent of us, and that this reality is common to all sentient beings that perceive it.

Many philosophical models and spiritual movements want to tell you that there is no such thing as an external reality. I understand the arguments presented to make this case (although in fact, most spiritual movements, as opposed to certain philosophical traditions that deny an external reality, present no arguments at all: they simply state that there is no such thing as reality as a fact, and the entire cosmology proceeds from it), but I reject them. Let me explain why.

To take a first simple example, while it is true that when looked at from the point of view of a photon of light, say, imagining for an instant that such a thing were possible, the universe and all of the material things within it would not appear as they do to us, but would resemble a matrix of energy fluxes, constantly conjoined, but pulsing with more intensity (you, me, planets, cats, etc.) here and there. Disconnectedness, from such a point of view, is an illusion. Therefore, many theorists argue, the ancient Vedic teachers of Hinduism and pre-Hinduism were right: all reality is simply Maya, or illusion, and there is no external reality.

The basic flaw in this thinking is to mistake a perception of reality with reality itself. The fact that I might see a tree as a huge, expressive, living organism, and that a businessman might see a tree as a financially viable wood-asset, does not change the external reality of the tree itself. The tree is always the tree, no matter how differently people perceive it.

The fact that the universe seems to be an interconnected energy flux from the point of view of a photon of light, and seems to be a collection of discrete objects of variable mass from a human perspective, doesn’t change the nature of the universe itself. It is only ever both things, at the same time, from the point of view of multiple perspectives, but one perspective does not cancel out another.

Another objection to the external reality hypothesis is that our perceptions of reality change over time. For a very long time, for example, people believed that the Sun revolved around the Earth. That was the external reality, so far as people of the time were concerned. That perception of reality changed, however, and a new perception became the external reality, so the argument runs. Isn’t it the case, then, that we’ll never actually know, with 100% accuracy what the external reality is, because as we learn more and more about it, the external reality will keep changing?

While it seems convincing, at first glance, this argument once again confuses the perception of reality with reality itself. The very fact that our perception of the external reality keeps changing, as we gather more and more data about the universe, is proof that the external reality exists. It makes no rational sense to argue that our perception of an illusion would keep changing over time, as we gather more data about the illusion. This process of changing our perception of reality as more data is accumulated – which incontestably exists – can only be sensible if that external reality actually exists.

The Earth always revolved around the Sun – whether we perceived it to do that or not. Our changes in perception, based on accumulations of new data, and new theoretical interpretations of the data, do not change the external reality: these changes in perception can only ever change the way we perceive the external reality, but they do not change the external reality itself.

So, as we accumulate new data, and continue to refine our perception of the external reality, we are always approaching a more perfect, but never perfect, perception of an external reality that exists, whether we understand it in ever more sophisticated ways, or not.

OTHER OBJECTIONS

There are other objections to the existence of an independent reality, and all of them have been raised with me during the thousands of discussions that have contributed to the development of Resolution Theory. Let’s deal with two of the more persistent or frequently raised objections now.

Some argue that observer experiments in physics, particularly those related to superposition phenomena, where a given “particle” may seem to behave in two different ways, depending upon how it is being observed, or when two “particles” separated by vast distances appear to react in synchronous ways (something often called “spooky action at a distance”). The inference usually drawn from these experiments by objectors is that if our action as observers can change reality, then an independent reality (that is, a reality that exists whether we are here to perceive it or not) is thrown into doubt – or is even impossible.

The problem with these observer experiments is that they are not, strictly speaking, observer experiments. There is always an apparatus involved: some device that is used to measure or detect the actions of the particles under review. And when we introduce a piece of apparatus into a given scenario, we are already changing the reality that we’re “observing.”

Another important point is that once again, even if there is an appearance of reality being changed by our observer experiment, the very experiment is predicated on the existence of an external reality that can be measured and influenced, and that those observable effects can be detected. To posit this observer experiment without accepting the existence of an external reality in the first place makes no logical sense.

Furthermore, the superposition phenomena being quoted by objectors are not fully understood. As the physicist Richard Feynman once said, “If you think you understand quantum physics, you don’t.”

My own intuition on the puzzles of superposition phenomena is that they will always involve the exchange of photons of light, and that the non-physical characteristics of light will account for the enigma of superposition (there’ll be more about the metaphysical properties of light much later in the seminars).

But the simple fact remains that superposition is so insufficiently understood that it cannot be held up as a valid objection to the existence of an independent reality.

More philosophical objections come from various arguments about the nature of certainty. The question is posed: “Can we ever be certain of anything?” The suggestion is made, after various examples of human minds being effectively and efficiently deceived, that perhaps reality as we know it is just a “Truman Show” (see Peter Weir’s superb film of the same name) illusion, and our senses are constantly being tricked by a conspiracy, or a supercomputer. Or perhaps, they argue, we are only dreaming this reality, or hallucinating it, and none of it is real.

The rational and reasonable objections to the Truman Show objection are:

1) Confirmation, where independent other minds and/or detection devices confirm our conclusion that an external reality exists;

2) The Cartesian argument (named after Renee Descartes, 1596-1650), which concludes that even if this reality I perceive is all a massive deception, there must be a “Me” somewhere, who is being deceived (Cogito, Ergo Sum: I think, There I Am). And if there is a “Me,” that “Me” must be sustained by certain life-supporting elements such as oxygen, water, nutrients and waste production, not to mention a pair of originating progenitors that brought “Me” into existence in the first place. Such a sustaining web of interacting elements, capable of bring “Me” into existence and supporting “Me” while I am being deceived, would constitute an external, independent reality.

Strangely enough, there are philosophers who insist that they’re unconvinced by these very convincing responses to the Truman Show objection to the existence of an external reality. When I encounter them now, I simply ask them to accompany me to the roof of the nearest tall building, and to stand on the ledge with me. I invite them, if they truly believe that the external reality is nothing more than an illusion, or a social construct issuing from a discourse, or that it cannot be proved to exist, to step off the edge of the ledge.

They never do it, because despite all of their sophistry, deep down they all accept the existence of an external reality – the same reality that you, and I and every other rational and reasonable-minded person in the world accepts, which is that if we step off the ledge, we’ll fall – and deep down they all know that this external reality exists regardless of how differently we may perceive it.

There are other objections to the existence of an external reality, but they are all as flawed as the objections I’ve raised here. The bottom line for Resolution Theory – the first of the foundational propositions – is that there is an external reality, that this reality is not an illusion, that this reality is independent of us, and that this reality is common to all sentient beings that perceive it.

Okay, now the journey into Resolution Theory has finally begun.

In the next seminar I’ll present the Second Proposition.

Until then, I wish you good luck and good thinking, and send you my best wishes,

GDR.